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Abstract. Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) protect major hazard fa-
cilities, e.g. power plants, against catastrophic accidents. An SIS con-
sists of hardware components and a controller software – the “program”.
Current safety analyses of SIS’ include the construction of a fault tree,
summarising potential faults of the components and how they can arise
within an SIS. The exercise of identifying faults typically relies on the ex-
perience of the safety engineer. Unfortunately the program part is often
too complicated to be analysed in such a “by hand” manner and so the
impact it has on the resulting safety analysis is not accurately captured.
In this paper we demonstrate how a formal model for faults and failure
modes can be used to analyse the impact of an SIS program. We outline
the underlying concepts of Failure Mode Reasoning and its application
in safety analysis, and we illustrate the ideas on a practical example.
1 Introduction
Plant accidents can have catastrophic consequences. An explosion at a chemical
plant in eastern China killed over 70 people and injured more than 600 in 2019.
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) are protection mechanisms against major
plant accidents [16]. Failure of SIS components can result in the SIS being un-
available to respond to hazardous situations. It is therefore crucial to analyse
and address such failures. A typical SIS comprises physical components to in-
teract with plant, and a software program3 that analyses the information and
initiates safety actions. Such software can be highly complex, and even when it
is not itself faulty still propagate input faults from the sensors to the safety actu-
ators. This paper concerns a current omission in the standard safety engineering
process: that of an accurate fault analysis of complex SIS program.
Well established methods, such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), already exist
in the industry for analysing and quantifying SIS failure modes [31]. FTA is a
deductive method that uses fault trees for quantitative and qualitative analysis
of failure scenarios. A fault tree is a graphical representation of the conditions
that contribute to the occurrence of a predefined failure event. A fault tree will be
created by a safety analyst and based on their knowledge and understanding of
the failure behaviours in a system. Not only are such by-hand analyses inherently
subject to human-error, they also require expertise, time and effort.
3 In this paper the term program refers to the software code run by SIS CPU; also
known in safety standards as SIS Application Program [16].
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A new method, Failure Mode Reasoning (FMR), was recently introduced to
circumvent the need for by-hand analysis of parts of SIS [17]. Using a special
calculus built on failure modes, FMR analyses the SIS program to identify the
hardware faults at SIS inputs that can result in a given failure at its output. The
main outcome of FMR is a short list of failure modes, which can also be used to
calculate the probability of failure. In this paper we show how to use ideas from
formal methods to justify FMR. We use an abstraction to model failures directly,
and we show that such an abstraction can be used to track failures within the SIS
program so that potential output failures can be linked to the potential input
failures that cause them. We prove the soundness of the technique and illustrate
it on a practical example.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief ex-
planation of the context and how FMR can enhance safety analysis. Section 3
formalises the underlying ideas of analysis of failures for SIS programs. Based
on these concepts, Sections 4 and 5 formulate the concepts for composing the
individual elements in FMR and the reasoning process on the interactions be-
tween these elements. Section 6 includes descriptions of how FMR is applied in
practice and in particular in large scale projects. Finally Sections 7 and 8 wrap
up the paper with a review of FMR’s position with respect to other research
works and potential research in future.
2 SIS and FMR
An SIS consists of sensors, a logic solver, and final elements. The sensors col-
lect data about the environment (such as temperature and pressure) and the
logic solver processes the sensor readings and controls the final elements to in-
tervene and prevent a hazard. Such interventions can include shutting down the
(industrial) plant and they are referred to as Safety Instrumented Functions
(SIFs). Fig. 1b illustrates a simple SIS consisting of two sensors, one logic solver
and one final element. This SIS performs only one SIF, which is to protect the
downstream process against high pressure in the upstream gas pipe. The sensors
measure the gas pressure and the logic solver initiates a command to close the
valve if the gas pressure exceeds a threshold limit.
SIS faults are typically modelled by using fault trees. For an accurate analysis
a fault tree must reflect all potential faults caused by all components in the SIS.
Clearly incorrect sensor readings are a significant factor in safety analysis as
they can lead to hazardous scenarios. One of the problems in safety analysis is
to understand how such deviations can be propagated by the SIS program and
lead to faults at SIS outputs. If done by hand, such understandings depends
critically on the analyst’s knowledge of the details of the SIS program.
Consider, for example the fault tree in Fig. 1a, which is meant to summarise
the failures of SIS in Fig. 1b: the SIS fails if both sensors fail or if the logic
solver fails or if the final element fails. The fault tree is built on the assumption
that the two sensors provide redundancy, which means that provided one of the
two sensors is in a healthy state, that is sufficient to detect potential hazards.
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(a) Fault Tree (b) SIS
Fig. 1: An example SIS and its corresponding fault tree model
However, the validity of this assumption, and thus the validity of the fault tree,
directly depends on the details of SIS program and how it computes the output
from the input. For example, if the two inputs from sensors are averaged first and
then compared to the high pressure limit as shown in Fig. 2a, the proposed fault
tree (Fig. 1a) is incorrect; because failure of one sensor will affect the average
of the two. But if each sensor reading is separately compared to the threshold
limit first (as in Fig. 2b), the sensors can be considered redundant and the fault
tree would summarise the failures accurately. While the two programs deliver
the same functionality, they do not show the same failure behaviour; and the
proposed fault tree can correspond to only one of them.
(a) Program TAvg (b) Program TOr
For variables i1, i2, w ∈ R and v, z, o ∈ B, and parameter K ∈ R: w = Avg(i1, i2) = (i1 + i2)/2,
o = GcomK(w) = (w > K) and o = Or(v, z) = v ∨ z.
Fig. 2: Two possible implementations for the Logic Solver in Fig.1a
In real world scenarios, SIS programs are large and complex. It is not unusual
for a typical SIS program to have hundreds of inputs like i1 and i2 and thousands
of Function Blocks [15] like Avg and GcomK . Conducting a detailed analysis of
program of such scales will be a real challenge for a human analyst, but it
nonetheless plays a crucial part in producing accurate results. In such scenarios
an automated method such as FMR can be of a great help.
FMR is a technique for enabling the details of SIS programs to be accurately
reflected in the full safety analysis of a system. The challenge we address is
identifying the SIS input “failure modes” that cause a given SIS output failure
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mode by analysing the SIS program that reads those inputs and produces that
output. The results can then be incorporated in an overall safety analysis of SIS.
SIS programs are commonly developed in the form of Function Block Dia-
grams (FBD) [15]. Fig. 2 showed two very simple examples of FBDs. An FBD
consists of function blocks and their interconnections, which we label with vari-
able names. In Fig. 2a, o, w, i1 and i2 are the variables and Avg and GcomK
are the function blocks. We will use this FBD as a worked example through this
paper to demonstrate the FMR process.
The SIS program given at Fig. 2a is supposed to initiate a command to
close the gas value when the pressure rises above a given threshold. In normal
circumstances, when all inputs report correct measurements from the sensor
readings, an output of t causes the correct shut down command to be delivered
when the pressure is high. Suppose however that the inputs i1, i2 are incorrectly
recording the pressure. These inaccuracies propagate through the program and
lead to an f at the output, meaning that the SIS will not initiate the safety action
required to prevent the hazardous event.
In simple terms, this is how FMR analyses such output deviations: from o
being f by fault we can conclude that w must be less than the threshold limit
set in GcomK : (o = f) ⇒ (w ≤ K). Sentence (w ≤ K) in turn implies that the
average value of i1 and i2 must be less than the threshold limit: (w ≤ K) ⇒
((i1 + i2)/2 ≤ K). Assuming that this is due to an input fault, we can conclude
that either input i1 must be reading lower than what it should, or input i2.
Overall, we can conclude:
(o being f by fault)⇒ (i1 reads too low) ∨ (i2 reads too low) (1)
Notice that the actual values of inputs are not required, but only their cate-
gories in terms of whether they are “too high”, or “too low”. It turns out that
we can take advantage of this abstraction to simplify the overall analysis. In
the next section we describe a simple model of failures from which we derive an
analysis that uses “failure modes” explicitly.4
FMR completes the SIS safety analysis by incorporating the functionally
most important part of the system – the program, and it does this by analysing
the actual program rather than a synthesised model. The process is automated
and thus it saves time and effort, and offers accuracy and certainty. The purpose
of FMR is similar to fault tree analysis, but it adds rigour to the consideration
of fault propagation in the SIS program.
3 Modelling failures
In this section we formalise the ideas underlying the identification and analysis
of potential failures for SIS programs. In particular the result of the analysis
should be the identification of potential faults and, in addition, to categorise
4 Note that in Fig. 2b the FMR analysis would produce a different result, i.e.
(o being f by fault) ⇒ (i1 reads too low) ∧ (i2 reads too low)
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them in terms of their “modes of failure”. This is an essential step in any safety
engineering exercise.
In what follows we use well known constructions from relational-style mod-
elling. Our contribution is to apply those ideas in this new setting for SIS pro-
grams. Let V be an abstract state space; we use PX for the power set over X.
A partition of a set X is a set of pairwise non-intersecting subsets in PX.
We begin with a simple abstract model for a generic SIS function. It is a
function which takes inputs to outputs over an (abstract) type V.
Definition 1. An abstract model for an SIS function is a function of type V →
V.
An SIS function can be a function block (FB), a combination of FBs or
the entire SIS program. As described above, the safety analyst can only access
information about the safety status of the system through the SIS program
variables. The challenge is that this reported status (i.e. the sensor readings)
might be inaccurate or wrong. To model such faults we need to keep track of
the values recorded in the SIS program variables and the value that should have
been reported. When these values are not the same we say that there is a fault.
The next definition shows how to keep track of these faults within a particular
SIS setting.
Definition 2. Given an SIS function f : V → V, a failure model is a function
〈f〉 : V2 → V2 defined by
〈f〉(m, a) := (f(m), f(a)) .
For the pair (m, a) ∈ V2, the first component m models the value reported by
the SIS program variables, and the second component a is the actual value that
should be reported. We say that (m, a) is a failure state whenever m 6= a. 5
For example, in Fig. 2a we model the simple SIS program as a function TAvg
of type R2 → B, where the input (pair) corresponds to the readings of the
variables i1, i2, and the output corresponds to the value of the output variable
o.6 There are two possible output failure states wrt. 〈TAvg〉 ∈ (R2)2 → (B)2, and
they are (t, f) and (f, t).
Observe however from Def. 2 that the only way an output failure state can
occur is if the corresponding input is also a failure state (since we are assuming
that no additional failures are caused by the SIS program itself). Given a function
f , we say that failure output state (m′, a′) was caused by input failure state (m, a)
if 〈f〉(m, a) = (m′, a′).
In the case of Fig. 2a, the failure state (f, t) can only be caused by input
failure state ((m1,m2), (a1, a2)) if either m1 < a1 or m2 < a2. Here the values
m1, a1 correspond to the variable i1 and m2, a2 correspond to the variable i2 in
the figure. In scenarios where e.g. m1 < a1 there is always some reported value
5 In our abstract model we use a single type V for simplicity of presentation.
6 Note here that we are distinguishing the types in the example.
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for m2 such that the reported average (m1+m2)/2 is below the fixed threshold
in GcomK , thus there exists a scenario satisfying the identified input constraints
such that:
〈TAvg〉((m1, a1), (m2, a2)) = (f, t) .
From this example we can see there are potentially infinitely many values for
a failure state (m, a) whenever m, a can take real values. Rather than a safety
engineer needing to know these precise values, what is more relevant is a report
of the (usually) finite number of classes or modes describing the kinds of failure.
Definition 3. Given a set of states V×V wrt. a failure model, the failure modes
are defined by a partition P of V×V. Each subset in P defines a failure mode
(relative to P). Two states (m, a) and (m′, a′) satisfy the same failure mode if
and only if they belong to the same partition subset of P.
Given a partition P defining a set of failure modes we define mdP : V×V → P
which maps failure states to their relevant failure mode (partition subset).
Examples of failure modes are normally described by constraints on vari-
ables. For instance in Fig. 2a the failure modes for the initial failure state
((m1,m2), (a1, a2)) are summarised by “either i1 is reading too low or i2 is
reading too low”. In terms of Def. 3 this can be characterised by part of a par-
tition that includes `1, `2 and `, where `1 is the set of failure states such that
m1 < a1 ∧m2 ≥ a2; `2 is the set of failure states such that m1 ≥ a1 ∧m2 < a2
and ` is the set of failure states such that m1 < a1 ∧m2 < a2.
Given an output failure mode, we would like to compute all initial failure
modes that could cause that final failure mode. We say that an initial failure
mode e (to an SIS function) causes an output failure mode e′ (of an SIS function)
if there exists a failure state satisfying e such that the output of the SIS function
given that initial state satisfies e′.
For a given SIS function f , one way to do this is to compute all relevant
failure states for 〈f〉, and then use mdP to interpret the failure modes for each
failure state. Our first observation is that, given a partition P defining the failure
modes, we can simplify this procedure significantly by abstracting the behaviour
of f to act directly in terms of the failure modes rather than failure states.
Definition 4. Let f : V → V be an SIS function, and P be a partition of V2
defining the set of failure modes as in Def. 3.
We define [f ]P : P → PP to be the failure mode abstraction of f as the
(possibly nondeterministic) function satisfying the following constraint for any
input (m, a) ∈ V2:
mdP ◦ 〈f〉(m, a) ∈ [f ]P ◦mdP(m, a) .
In Fig. 2a, where the initial failure modes are `1, `2 and ` explained above, and
final failure modes are f = {(f, t)} and t = {(t, f)}, we can see that [TAvg]P(`1)
Reasoning with failures 7
contains f, where we are writing P to represent the partition defined by all initial
and final variables.7
We shall show below that there are a variety of functions that have well-
defined failure mode abstractions. Our next task however, is to show that the
abstraction defined by Def. 4 is compositional, i.e. the abstraction of f ; g of SIS
functions f and g can be computed from the composition of their abstractions.
We recall the well-known Kleisli lifting of set-valued [24,23] functions as follows.
We write the composition f ; g to mean first f is executed, and then g, or as
functions the output from initial s is g(f(s)).
Let ρ : T → PT, define ρ† : PT → PT
ρ†(K) :=
⋃
k∈K
ρ(k) . (2)
Lemma 1. Let f, g be SIS functions which have well-defined failure-mode ab-
stractions as given by Def. 4. The failure-mode abstraction for the composition
[f ; g]P is equal to [g]
†
P ◦ [f ]P, where [g]†P : PP → PP is the standard lifting set
out at Eqn. 2 above. 8
Proof. (Sketch) We show, for any input (m, a), that:
mdP ◦ 〈g〉 ◦ 〈f〉(m, a) ∈ [g]†P ◦ [f ]P ◦mdP(m, a) ,
and that all failure modes arise in this way. The result follows from Def. 4, and
standard manipulations of set-valued functions [24,1].
The failure mode abstractions [f ]P enable a significant simplification in the
identification of possible failures in an SIS program. For example we shall see that
[TAvg]P = [GcomK ]
†
P ◦ [Avg]P for abstractions of the function blocks [GcomK ]P
and [Avg]P.
In general a safety analyst considers possible output failure modes and asks
for the inputs that potentially cause them. In some circumstances some failure
modes can never be satisfied by any input, and are deemed unreachable. The
analyst is thus able to concentrate on reachable failure modes, defined next.
Definition 5. Given an SIS function f , and abstraction defined by Def. 4. A
failure mode m ∈ P is reachable (wrt. f) if there is some input failure state
(i, i′) such that mdP ◦ 〈f〉(i, i′) = m.
Failure Mode Reasoning is based on backwards calculational reasoning. We
use a weak transformer to compute all input failure modes which can possibly
cause a given output failure mode. This is similar to the dual transformer of
dynamic logic [7] and the conjugate transformer [25] for the well-known guarded
command language [11].
7 More precisely we would define failure modes separately on inputs and outputs, and
indeed this is what happens in practice. To simplify the presentation however we
assume that there is a single partition which serves to define failure modes on a
single set, without distinguishing between inputs and outputs.
8 Recall that for simplicity we assume that the function modes P applies to both
functions f and g.
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Definition 6. Given SIS function9 f , we define the inverse failure transformer
[f ]−P : PP→ PP as
[f ]−P(K) := {k | [f ]P(k) ∩K 6= φ} . (3)
Def. 6 satisfies two properties. The first is that any initial failure modes
computed from final failure modes are the ones that could cause the selected
final failure modes. The second is that inverse failure transformers compute all
initial failure modes from final reachable failure modes. The next two definitions
formalise these properties.
Definition 7. Given SIS function f , we say an inverse failure transformer t is
sound wrt. f if all k ∈ t(K) implies [f ]P(k) ∩K 6= φ.
Definition 8. Given SIS function f , we say an inverse failure transformer t is
complete if for any set of reachable failure modes F and (initial) failure modes
I, we have the following:
I ⊆ t(F) ⇔ (∀i ∈ I · [f ]P(i) ∩F 6= φ) . (4)
Observe that given failure modes m and m′ such that m ∈ t{m′}, then m′ is
reachable if there is some (i, i′) such that mdP(i, i′) = m. In general the safety
engineer is not concerned with “unrealistic” failure modes in the sense that no
corresponding scenario comprised of failure states can be constructed.
It is clear from Def. 6 that [f ]−P is a sound and complete transformer relative
to f . The definition of completeness is important because it means, for the safety
engineer, that all potential failure modes are accounted for by the abstraction.
The next lemma records the fact that soundness and completeness is conserved
by function composition.
Lemma 2. Let f, g be SIS functions, and let P determine the failure modes so
that [f ]−p and [g]
−
p are sound and complete transformers. Then their composition
[f ]−p ◦ [g]−p is also sound and complete for the composition SIS function f ; g.
Proof. Follows from Def. 6 and standard facts about functions and their trans-
formers [24,25].
In this section we have set out a formal methods treatment of failure modes
for SIFs in SIS programs. We have demonstrated a simple model for failures and
shown how this “application-oriented” approach supports a rigorous analysis of
failure modes and how they are propagated in SIS programs. In the following
sections we show how this can be used to justify the use of standard backwards-
reasoning to compute all input failure modes that cause reachable failure modes.
9 We do not treat non-termination nor partial functions.
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4 Failure mode reasoning
In this section we show how to apply the failures model introduced in Section3
to the typical safety analysis.
Recall TAvg defined in Fig. 2a. In this example, the failure modes of interest
relate to whether the readings of the various sensors accurately record the phys-
ical environment or not, and when they do not, which combinations of deviant
readings have the potential to result in a hazard.
The safety analysis begins with the identification of hazardous outputs: these
are outputs from the SIS program which would directly cause a hazard if it is
not correct, in the sense that it deviates from the “true” result which would have
been output had all the sensors accurately recorded the status of the plant.
For simplicity we assume that all readings are real-valued, thus we identify
“True” with “1” and “False” with “0”. Following Def. 3 we set V = R and
identify a partition on R×R given as follows.
Definition 9. Define the failures partition as follows. Let h, l,m respectively
partition R×R defined by:
(r, r′) ∈ h iff r>r′ ; (r, r′) ∈ m iff r=r′ ; (r, r′) ∈ l iff r<r′ .
Here we have identified the common failure modes “reading too high”, corre-
sponding to h and “reading too low” corresponding to l. We have also included
“reading correct” corresponding to m which is not strictly speaking a “failure”,
but is useful in the formal analysis. From our gas pressure example, the situa-
tion where the input recorded on i1 is lower than the real pressure in the pipe
is modelled by pairs of values that lie in l.
Safety engineers want to know the input failure modes that “cause” particular
reachable output failures. Def. 8 and Lem. 2 above support a standard backwards
reasoning method on failure modes directly.
For each variable s in an SIS program we use sˆ for a corresponding variable
taking failure modes for values, which in this case is {h, l,m}.
Definition 10. Given an SIS function f and a partition P defining the failure
modes. A failure triple is written
{ sˆ ∈A } f { sˆ′ ∈A′ } , (5)
where A,A′ ⊆ {h, l,m}. The triple Eqn. 5 is valid if, for each failure mode e ∈
A there exists (m,m′) such that mdP(m,m′) = e and mdP(〈f〉(m,m′))∩A′ 6= φ.
Note that as a special case where A is a singleton set {a} we write “sˆ = a”
rather than “sˆ ∈A”.
Def. 5 is reminiscent of a standard Hoare Triple for failure modes, however a
failure triple is based on Def. 6. More importantly Def. 5 corresponds with the
scenarios relevant for the assessment of failures. Whenever f corresponds to an
SIS function for example, the valid triple given by Eqn. 5 means that the initial
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failure mode corresponding to a causes the final failure mode a′. This effectively
enables the identification of failure mode propagation, summarised in the next
result.
Theorem 1. Let f be an SIS function and P define the relevant failure modes.
Let a′ be a reachable final failure mode wrt. f . Then for all a ∈ [f ]−P{a′}
{ sˆ = a } f { sˆ′ = a′ }
is a valid failure triple.
Proof. Definition of [f ]−P , Def. 6.
Backwards reasoning for failure modes: As mentioned above we can use Thm. 1
to compute the failure modes that are the cause of a given reachable final failure
mode. A complex SIS program determining a SIF typically comprises multiple
function blocks with clearly defined “input” variables and “output” variables,
where the outputs are determined by the values on the inputs. The architecture
of the SIS program is then equated with a composition of a series of function
blocks. Now that we have a formal description in terms of failure triples, we are
able to use the standard composition rule:
{ sˆ = a } f1 { sˆ1 = b } ∧ { sˆ1 = b } f2 { sˆ′ = a′ }
⇒ { sˆ = a } f1; f2 { sˆ′ = a′ } .
From this we can now deduce failure triples of a complex SIS program by
reasoning about failure triples for component function blocks. We illustrate this
for Avg and GcomK in the next section.
5 Individual function blocks
A typical SIS program library, from which function blocks (FBs) are chosen, may
include 100 types of FBs [30]. For each FB the relationships between FB input
failure modes and FB output failure modes, can be summarised in a Failure
Mode Block (FMB). An FMB is proposed based on the well-defined function of
its corresponding FB. In this section we will propose FMBs for SIS functions
Avg and GcomK , which we used in our gas pressure example, and we will prove
the soundness and completeness of the proposed FMBs. More sample FMBs are
proposed and proven in the Appendix.
The Avg function block takes two inputs and computes the average. The
relevant output failures therefore are whether the output reads too high or too
low. The abstraction for failure modes is given below.
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Definition 11. Let Avg be the function defined by: Avg(i1, i2):= (i1+i2)/2. Its
associated FMB, FAvg, is defined as follows:
{ˆi1 = h ∨ iˆ2 = h} Avg {oˆ = h}
{ˆi1 = l ∨ iˆ2 = l} Avg {oˆ = l}
iˆ1 = h ∧ iˆ2 = l∨
iˆ1 = l ∧ iˆ2 = h∨
iˆ1 = m ∧ iˆ2 = m
 Avg {oˆ = m}
Def. 11 tells us that if the output reads too high, then it must be because one
of the two inputs also reads too high. Similarly, if the output reads too low then
it can only be because one of the two inputs reads too low. On the other hand
the output can deliver an accurate result for scenarios where one input reads
too high and the other reads too low. At the qualitative level of abstraction,
however, all of these possibilities must be accounted for.
GcomK is another typical function block which compares the input with a
given threshold and reports whether the input meets the given threshold.
Definition 12. Let GcomK be the function defined by: GcomK(i):= (i > K).
Its associated FMB, FGcom, is defined as follows:
{ˆi = h} GcomK {oˆ = t}
{ˆi = l} GcomK {oˆ = f}
{ˆi = l ∨ iˆ = m ∨ iˆ = h} GcomK {oˆ = m}
Def. 12 tells us that the output reading f when it should read t can only
happen when the input is delivering a lower value than it should, and similarly
the output reading t when it should read f can only happen when the input
reading is falsely reporting a high value. Notice that this definition is actually
independent of K, which is why K is suppressed in the FMB model.
The following theorem confirms that Def. 11 and Def. 12 are sound and
complete in respect of their operational definitions.
Theorem 2. The FAvg and FGcom models Definitions Def. 11 and Def. 12
are the sound and complete failure models of Avg and GcomK (for all real-valued
K).
Proof. Individual FMBs can be proven by using truth-tables. All possible com-
binations of faults at the inputs and outputs of a corresponding FB can be
defined, based on which the soundness and completeness conditions can be ex-
amined. Detailed proof is given in Appendix.
6 FMR in practice
The FMR process consists of four main stages: composition, substitution, sim-
plification and calculation. In the composition stage, FMBs and failure mode
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variables are defined and connected in accordance with the SIS program. The
model for our example SIS program (Fig. 2a) will include two FMBs: FAvg and
FGcom. Similarly, variables o, w, i1 and i2 in SIS program will have their own
corresponding failure mode variables oˆ, wˆ, iˆ1 and iˆ2 in the model.
The reasoning process begins at the last FB, i.e. the one that produces the
SIS output. In our gas pressure example, the given output fault is oˆ = f. Taking
into account the function of GcomK from Def. 12, we can say:
{wˆ = l} GcomK {oˆ = f} (6)
Statement (6) suggests that output o being f by fault implies that the input
to the greater comparison FB, w, is reading lower than what it should.
The reasoning process continues through the SIS program until all the conclu-
sion parts of the implication statements include no more intermediate variables.
In our example, the next FB is Avg. Considering the function of Avg, if the fault
wˆ = l occurs at its output, we can conclude that from Def. 11:
{ˆi1 = l ∨ iˆ2 = l} Avg {wˆ = l} (7)
This statement suggests that if the reported value at w is lower than its
intended value, then either input i1 or i2 may be reading lower. The reasoning
sequence terminates here as the left hand side of (7) only includes SIS inputs.
In the second stage of FMR we use the logical composition rules to eliminate
intermediate variables in order to reduce the set of FB failure reasons to only one
relation that links SIS inputs to its outputs. In our example, the only internal
variable is wˆ. By substituting (7) in (6) we can conclude:
{ˆi1 = l ∨ iˆ2 = l} Avg;GcomK {oˆ = f} (8)
which is very similar to the result (1) of our earlier informal description of FMR.
The third stage of FMR is simplification, where we use standard rules of
propositional logic [6] to simplify (8) and create the FMR short list of failure
triples. As (8) is already minimal, we can easily see that our short list of faults
comprises iˆ1 = l and iˆ2 = l.
Having the input failure modes identified, we can implement the last stage of
analysis, calculation, in which we would assign probability values to individual
failure events and calculate the overall probability of failure. We skip this stage
for this simple example. A comprehensive safety analysis for a realistic case study
is described in other work [17].
In a more recent project [18] we examined a larger case study where we
integrated FMR with other model-base analysis methods HiP-HOPS [26] and
CFT [20]. We demonstrated that not only is FMR able to handle larger examples
with precision, but its output can also be of value to other safety analysis tools
that are designed to model generic systems but not programs. The process we
examined in this case study is briefly shown in Fig. 3: a SIS that protects a
gas-fired industrial boiler against high level of water. The SIS program in this
example consists of over 2170 function blocks. With close to 100 inputs and
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Fig. 3: SIS configuration
over 25 outputs, the SIS performs a total of 34 safety functions (SIFs). The SIS
program in this project was developed in FBD and saved in XML format.
The FMR analysis produced two short lists of failure modes, one for Danger-
ous Undetected (DU) failure and one for Spurious Trip (ST). The lists included
a total of 39 failure scenarios. In the quantitative stage the failure data of SIS
inputs were entered and the aggregated probability measures for DU and ST
failures were calculated.
Provided that failure data are readily available, the whole analysis process for
an SIS of this scale takes less than an hour to complete, using the experimental
system incorporating FMR analysis [18]. Conducting similar analysis by hand
would take days. To visualise the extent of work, consider manual implementa-
tion of a fault tree with around 3500 gates. Even if the analyst is prepared for
such a challenge, the implemented model, and thus its outcome, will be prone
to human error. In comparison, FMR is fast, accurate, consistent, and reliable.
7 Discussion and related works
Reasoning about faults is not a new research topic. Diagnostics based on sys-
tematic inference was extensively studied in the 1980’s. Some of the frequently
cited articles include [8,14,27]. Generally speaking, the studies were aimed at
answering one question: given an observed deviation at the output of a system,
how can we identify the (potentially) faulty components by reasoning based on
the knowledge of system structure and/or system function? Logic circuits, in
particular, would make an interesting application as they typically consist of
complex yet well-defined, logical structures. Unlike inference-based diagnostics,
FMR is primarily designed to target probable input faults, rather than faulty sys-
tem components. Input faults are external to the system and do not represent
system failure scenarios.
FMR uses abstraction techniques, which is also a well-established area, par-
ticularly in formal methods [5]. One may find similarities between the abstraction
in FMR and that of Qualitative Reasoning (QR), where quantitative aspects of
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physical systems are replaced with qualitative representations [2,9]. It should be
noted however that QR is a method for expressing physical entities, and with
an application in AI; whereas FMR is a technique for reasoning about failures,
and (at least, currently) focused on conventional safety systems.
FMR is in some respects similar to FTA. Both methods look at the root
causes that can result in a given top event. Parts of the computation techniques
are similar between the two methods as well. However, FMR and FTA are dif-
ferent in some conceptual respects. FTA is a generic method that can be applied
to any fault in any type of system, whereas FMR is specifically designed for
analysing SIS programs. FTA computes a Boolean state of failure-success, but
FMR computes multiple failure modes. The top event in FTA is a single event,
but the program output in FMR can be an array of variables. The main question
FMR tries to answer is that: given an abstracted state of output and given the
function that produces it, what are the possible (abstracted) states of inputs to
that function. This is obviously different to FTA in which we “know” the fail-
ure behaviour of a system and we build a model (fault tree) to summarise our
understanding. FTA relies on the knowledge and skills of the analyst whereas
FMR extracts information directly from the system. In a general term, FTA is
a failure modeling method while FMR is a mode calculation method.
FTA was first introduced in 1961 to study a missile launch control system. In
almost six decades, many extensions and variations of the method have been in-
troduced to solve other types of problems. Useful surveys are conducted on FTA
and its extensions in recent years [28,19]. Thanks to the growing capabilities
of today’s technology, attention has shifted towards modularity and automatic
synthesis of fault trees, which can greatly assist with solving complex problems
at less effort. Various model-based dependability analysis methods have been
developed, such as HiP-HOPS [26,29], AADL [13] and AltaRica [22], which use
FTA as their primary means and automate the synthesis process to some de-
grees. More recently, the concept of contract-based design has also been used for
automatic generation of hierarchical fault trees from formal models [3].
The common concept in automatic hierarchical synthesis of fault trees is that
if we have the typical definition of component fault trees, we can synthesise the
system level fault tree by interconnecting the smaller fault trees of components.
At a conceptual level, this idea is utilised by FMR too; however, the components
in FMR are the FBs, as opposed to the other methods that analyse physical
systems. Also, while FMR uses the actual SIS program for its analysis, the other
methods rely on separate models or specifications in order to generate fault trees.
The actual running program in SIS is always the most accurate, detailed, and
specific source of information on the behaviour of system, and having that FMR
does not require any additional models.
Model checking has been used in SIS related applications too (see [12,21] as
examples). In model checking a formal specification of system (model) is checked
against a formal specification of requirements. Such methods focus on verifying
the program against the requirements, as opposed to FMR which aims to identify
failure modes.
Reasoning with failures 15
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) is about determining whether a first
order formula is satisfiable with respect to some logical theory [10,4]. SMT solvers
are used in various applications in the field of computer and formal verification.
With respect to FMR, SMT can potentially help with determining the SIS input
values that can result in a given output value. While this makes a potential area
for further research; our experiments so far indicate that any SMT analysis will
require post-processing in order to transform the results into failure modes.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how techniques from traditional formal methods
can be brought to bear on a challenging problem in safety engineering: that
of determining with precision how faults arising from incorrect sensor readings
propagate through complex SIS programs. Within the safety engineering dis-
cipline, FMR is a novel way to analyse failure modes in Safety Instrumented
Systems. Future work will include more complex constructs for function blocks,
including looping, timing and probabilistic analysis. Moreover, we are working
on implementing FMR for identify systematic failures in SIS programs, where
the input to the program is correct but the output is faulty due to a pre-existing
error in program.
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A Truth tables for individual FBs
All possible failure scenario related to Avg are summarised in Table 1. In this
Table, the 2nd and 3rd columns indicate the relationships between reported and
intended values at inputs x1 and x2 and the 4
th column shows the type of fault
at the output y, caused by the inputs x1 and x2. A question mark indicates that
the relation between m′ and a′ cannot be determined; i.e., all faults are possible.
The last three columns in Table 1 translate the 2nd, 3rd and 4th columns into
failure modes, as used in the FMR modeling.
no. (x1 = m1, a1) (x2 = m2, a2) (y = m
′, a′) xˆ1 xˆ2 yˆ
1 m1 < a1 m2 < a2 m
′ < a′ l l l
2 m1 < a1 m2 = a2 m
′ < a′ l m l
3 m1 < a1 m2 > a2 m
′ ? a′ l h a
4 m1 = a1 m2 < a2 m
′ < a′ m l l
5 m1 = a1 m2 = a2 m
′ = a′ m m m
6 m1 = a1 m2 > a2 m
′ > a′ m h h
7 m1 > a1 m2 < a2 m
′ ? a′ h l a
8 m1 > a1 m2 = a2 m
′ > a′ h m h
9 m1 > a1 m2 > a2 m
′ > a′ h h h
Table 1: Truth-table for Avg
To use Table 1 for FB Avg defined by Def. 11, recall that xˆ1 ≡ iˆ1, xˆ2 ≡ iˆ2
and yˆ ≡ oˆ. To prove Theorem 2, all we need to do is to group the combinations
of xˆ1 and xˆ2 that correspond to l, h, and m in yˆ column. It is evident from Table
1 that rows 1-4 compose yˆ = l, rows 6-9 compose yˆ = h, and rows 3, 5 and 7
compose yˆ = m. Compare these combinations with the ones given in Def. 11.
Likewise, Table 2 can be used to prove Theorem 2 for FB GcomK as defined
by Def. 12.
no. (x = m, a) m′ a′ xˆ yˆ
1 K < m < a t t l m
2 K < m = a t t m m
3 K < a < m t t h m
4 m ≤ K < a f t l f
5 a ≤ K < m t f h t
6 m < a ≤ K f f l m
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7 m = a ≤ K f f m m
8 a < m ≤ K f f h m
Table 2: Truth-table for GcomK
In the remaining part of this Appendix we propose FMBs for function blocks
Add, Sub, Abs, LcomK , Not, And and Or, and we present truth-tables that can
be used to prove them.
Definition 13. Let Add be the function defined by: Add(x1, x2):=x1+x2. Its
associated FMB, FAdd, is defined as follows:
{xˆ1 = h ∨ xˆ2 = h} Add {yˆ = h}
{xˆ1 = l ∨ xˆ2 = l} Add {yˆ = l} xˆ1 = h ∧ xˆ2 = l∨xˆ1 = l ∧ xˆ2 = h∨
xˆ1 = m ∧ xˆ2 = m
 Add {yˆ = m}
no. (x1 = m1, a1) (x2 = m2, a2) (y = m
′, a′) xˆ1 xˆ2 yˆ
1 m1 < a1 m2 < a2 m
′ < a′ l l l
2 m1 < a1 m2 = a2 m
′ < a′ l m l
3 m1 < a1 m2 > a2 m
′ ? a′ l h a
4 m1 = a1 m2 < a2 m
′ < a′ m l l
5 m1 = a1 m2 = a2 m
′ = a′ m m m
6 m1 = a1 m2 > a2 m
′ > a′ m h h
7 m1 > a1 m2 < a2 m
′ ? a′ h l a
8 m1 > a1 m2 = a2 m
′ > a′ h m h
9 m1 > a1 m2 > a2 m
′ > a′ h h h
Table 3: Truth-table for Add
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Definition 14. Let Sub be the function defined by: Sub(x1, x2):=x1−x2. Its
associated FMB, FSub, is defined as follows:
{xˆ1 = h ∨ xˆ2 = l} Sub {yˆ = h}
{xˆ1 = l ∨ xˆ2 = h} Sub {yˆ = l} xˆ1 = l ∧ xˆ2 = l∨xˆ1 = h ∧ xˆ2 = h∨
xˆ1 = m ∧ xˆ2 = m
 Sub {yˆ = m}
no. (x1 = m1, a1) (x2 = m2, a2) (y = m
′, a′) xˆ1 xˆ2 yˆ
1 m1 < a1 m2 < a2 m
′ ? a′ l l a
2 m1 < a1 m2 = a2 m
′ < a′ l m l
3 m1 < a1 m2 > a2 m
′ < a′ l h l
4 m1 = a1 m2 < a2 m
′ > a′ m l h
5 m1 = a1 m2 = a2 m
′ = a′ m m m
6 m1 = a1 m2 > a2 m
′ < a′ m h l
7 m1 > a1 m2 < a2 m
′ > a′ h l h
8 m1 > a1 m2 = a2 m
′ > a′ h m h
9 m1 > a1 m2 > a2 m
′ ? a′ h h a
Table 4: Truth-table for Sub
Definition 15. Let Abs be the function defined by: Abs(x):= |x|. Its associated
FMB, FAbs, is defined as follows:
{xˆ = l} Abs {yˆ = t}
{xˆ = h} Abs {yˆ = f}
{xˆ = l ∨ xˆ = m ∨ xˆ = h} Abs {yˆ = m}
no. (x = m, a) (y = m′, a′) xˆ yˆ
1 0 ≤ m < a m′ < a′ l l
2 0 ≤ m = a m′ = a′ m m
3 0 ≤ a < m m′ > a′ h h
4 m < a < 0 m′ > a′ l h
5 m = a < 0 m′ > a′ m h
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6 a < m < 0 m′ < a′ h l
7 m < 0 ≤ a m′ ? a′ l a
8 a < 0 ≤ m m′ ? a′ h a
Table 5: Truth-table for Abs
Definition 16. Let LcomK be the function defined by: LcomK(x):= (x < K).
Its associated FMB, FLcom, is defined as follows:
{xˆ = l} LcomK {yˆ = t}
{xˆ = h} LcomK {yˆ = f}
{xˆ = l ∨ xˆ = m ∨ xˆ = h} LcomK {yˆ = m}
no. (x = m, a) m′ a′ xˆ yˆ
1 K > m > a t t h m
2 K > m = a t t m m
3 K > a > m t t l m
4 m ≥ K > a f t h f
5 a ≥ K > m t f l t
6 m > a ≥ K f f h m
7 m = a ≥ K f f m m
8 a > m ≥ K f f l m
Table 6: Truth-table for LcomK
Definition 17. Let Not be the function defined by: Not(x):=¬x. Its associated
FMB, FNot, is defined as follows:
{xˆ = t} Not {yˆ = f}
{xˆ = f} Not {yˆ = t}{
xˆ = m
}
Not {yˆ = m}
no. m a m′ a′ xˆ yˆ
1 f f t t m m
2 f t t f f t
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3 t f f t t f
4 t t f f m m
Table 7: Truth-table for Not
Definition 18. Let And be the function defined by: And(x1, x2):=x1 ∧ x2. Its
associated FMB, FAnd, is defined as follows: xˆ1 = t ∧ xˆ2 = t∨xˆ1 = t ∧ xˆ2 = m∨
xˆ1 = m ∧ xˆ2 = t
 And {yˆ = t}
{
xˆ1 = f ∨ xˆ2 = f
}
And {yˆ = f}
xˆ1 = f ∧ xˆ2 = t∨
xˆ1 = t ∧ xˆ2 = f∨
xˆ1 = f ∧ xˆ2 = m∨
xˆ1 = m ∧ xˆ2 = f∨
xˆ1 = m ∧ xˆ2 = t∨
xˆ1 = t ∧ xˆ2 = m∨
xˆ1 = m ∧ xˆ2 = m

And {yˆ = m}
no. m1 a1 m2 a2 m
′ a′ xˆ1 xˆ2 yˆ10
1 f f f f f f m m m
2 f f f t f f m f m
3 f f t f f f m t m
4 f f t t f f m m m
5 f t f f f f f m m
6 f t f t f t f f f
7 f t t f f f f t m
8 f t t t f t f m f
9 t f f f f f t m m
10 t f f t f f t f m
11 t f t f t f t t t
12 t f t t t f t m tu
13 t t f f f f m m m
10 Mode u in column yˆ is explained later.
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14 t t f t f t m f f
15 t t t f t f m t tu
16 t t t t t t m m m
Table 8: Truth-table for And
Definition 19. Let Or be the function defined by: Or(x1, x2):=x1 ∨ x2. Its as-
sociated FMB, FOr, is defined as follows:{
xˆ1 = t ∨ xˆ2 = t
}
Or {yˆ = t} xˆ1 = f ∧ xˆ2 = f∨xˆ1 = f ∧ xˆ2 = m∨
xˆ1 = m ∧ xˆ2 = f
 Or {yˆ = f}

xˆ1 = f ∧ xˆ2 = t∨
xˆ1 = t ∧ xˆ2 = f∨
xˆ1 = f ∧ xˆ2 = m∨
xˆ1 = m ∧ xˆ2 = f∨
xˆ1 = m ∧ xˆ2 = t∨
xˆ1 = t ∧ xˆ2 = m∨
xˆ1 = m ∧ xˆ2 = m

Or {yˆ = m}
no. m1 a1 m2 a2 m
′ a′ xˆ1 xˆ2 yˆ
1 f f f f f f m m m
2 f f f t f t m f fu
3 f f t f t f m t t
4 f f t t t t m m m
5 f t f f f t f m fu
6 f t f t f t f f f
7 f t t f t t f t m
8 f t t t t t f m m
9 t f f f t f t m t
10 t f f t t t t f m
11 t f t f t f t t t
12 t f t t t t t m m
13 t t f f t t m m m
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14 t t f t t t m f m
15 t t t f t t m t m
16 t t t t t t m m m
Table 9: Truth-table for Or
Practical implementation: For FMBs FAnd and FOr (Tables 8 and 9), we used
subscript u in column yˆ to represent uncertain faults [17]. These are the scenarios
for which a judgment on the propagation of fault cannot be made. Consider line
2 in Table 9 as an example. We know that the reported values at inputs x1 and
x2 and output y are all f, and that matches up the function of Or. However, we
cannot make a judgment as to which input dominates that state of the output;
neither input f has priority over the other. This is different to the scenario in line
3, for instance, because the reported output is certainly dominated by the faulty
input, which reports t. For an FB output to be in a faulty state, not only the
reported state of the output should be reachable by the given inputs, but its fault
status should be a certain cause of a dominating input fault too. Otherwise, we
cannot make a statement on whether and how the fault can propagate through
the FB.
In practice, uncertain failure scenarios such as rows 12 and 15 in Table 8
and rows 2 and 5 in Table 9 will not be used for tracking failure modes in
SIS programs. While this early filtering at the FB level may compromise the
theoretical condition of completeness in some cases, it helps prevent producing
combinations of non-faulty inputs as “failure” modes at the program level.
Another filtering mechanism in FMR’s backward tracking concerns the mode
m. During the tracking process, when we come across a variable with that par-
ticular mode, we do not continue tracking from that point any further. This is
on the basis that, for whatever reasons, if a combination of input faults have
resulted in no fault at the output, the combination is not important; i.e. the
program output is immune against the failure combination in question.
In summary, the practical implementation of FAnd and FOr will include
the following limited scenarios, which as can be seen are similar to the normal
functions of AND and OR gates with two inputs:{
xˆ1 = t ∧ xˆ2 = t
}
And {yˆ = t}{
xˆ1 = f ∨ xˆ2 = f
}
And {yˆ = f}{
xˆ1 = t ∨ xˆ2 = t
}
Or {yˆ = t}{
xˆ1 = f ∧ xˆ2 = f
}
Or {yˆ = f}
